. 1 However, I write separately to note that I disagree with the merits and question the remedy of the Arthrex panel decision. I believe that viewed in light of the Director's significant control over the activities of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board and Administrative Patent Judges, APJs are inferior officers already properly appointed by the Secretary of Commerce.
But if APJs are properly considered principal officers, I have grave doubts about the remedy Arthrex applied to fix their unconstitutional appointment. In the face of an unconstitutional statute, our role is to determine whether severance of the unconstitutional portion would be consistent with Congress's intent. Given the federal employment protections APJs and their predecessors have enjoyed for more than three decades, I find no legislative intent to divest APJs of their Title 5 removal protections to cure any alleged constitutional defect. Because the bar to find non-severability is so high, though, I reluctantly agree with Arthrex's remedy.
I
None of the parties here or in Arthrex dispute that APJs are officers who exercise "significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States." Buckley v. Valeo, 1 The parties have raised the same arguments on the merits of the Appointments Clause issue in both Polaris cases before this panel, Nos. 2018 Nos. -1768 Nos. and 2018 Nos. -1831 However, the government contends that Polaris waived its Appointments Clause challenge in No. 2018-1768 because it failed to make the argument before the Board in the first instance. I need not address the waiver issue because this concurrence addresses only the merits of the Appointments Clause argument. And I address this concurrence to No. 2018-1831 because the parties agree the issue was preserved there.
424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976) (per curiam) . But "significant authority" marks the line between an officer and an employee, not a principal and an inferior officer. Despite being presented with the opportunity to do so, the Supreme Court has declined to "set forth an exclusive criterion for distinguishing between principal and inferior officers for Appointments Clause purposes." Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 661 (1997) .
Instead, the pertinent cases make clear that the hallmark of an inferior officer is whether a presidentially-nominated and senate-confirmed principal officer "direct[s] and supervise [s] [her work] at some level." Id. at 663. Edmond does not lay out a more exacting test than this, and we should not endeavor to create one in its stead. The cases employ an extremely context-specific inquiry, which accounts for the unique systems of direction and supervision in each case. See infra Section I. Finally, Edmond also makes clear that the Appointments Clause seeks to "preserve political accountability relative to important government assignments." 520 U.S. at 663. The current structure for appointing, directing and supervising, and removing APJs allows such political accountability through the Director's significant, substantive supervision of APJs' work, and the ability to discipline and terminate APJs to promote the efficiency of the service.
Arthrex, in my view, pays insufficient attention to the significant ways in which the Director directs and supervises the work of the APJs and, instead, focuses on whether the Director can single-handedly review and reverse Board decisions, and whether APJs are removable at will. In doing so, the Arthrex panel essentially distills the Supreme Court's direction and supervision test into two discrete questions: (1) are an officer's decisions reviewable by a principal officer and (2) is the officer removable at will? Because I believe that the Supreme Court would have announced such a simple test if it were proper, I respectfully disagree with the Arthrex panel decision that APJs are Case: 18-1831 Document: 97 Page: 5 Filed: 01/31/2020 principal officers. The Director's power to direct and supervise the Board and individual APJs, along with the fact that APJs are already removable under the efficiency of the service standard, suffices to render APJs inferior officers.
A
The Director may issue binding policy guidance, institute and reconsider institution of an inter partes review, select APJs to preside over an instituted inter partes review, single-handedly designate or de-designate any final written decision as precedential, and convene a panel of three or more members of his choosing to consider rehearing any Board decision. The Arthrex panel categorized some of these as "powers of review" and others as "powers of supervision," but I view them all as significant tools of direction and supervision.
As Arthrex recognized, " [t] he Director is 'responsible for providing policy direction and management supervision' for the [United States Patent and Trademark Office]." 941 F.3d at 1331 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 3(a)(2)(A)). Not only can the Director promulgate regulations governing inter partes review procedures, but he may also prospectively issue binding policy guidance "interpreting and applying the patent and trademark laws." Gov't. Br. 21. APJs must apply this guidance in all subsequent inter partes review proceedings. Such guidance might encompass, for instance, exemplary application of the law to specific fact patterns, such as those posed in pending cases. These powers provide the Director with control over the process and substance of Board decisions. Gov't. Br. 8, 21. And though the Director cannot directly reverse an individual Board decision that neglects to follow his guidance, APJs who do so risk discipline or removal under the efficiency of the service standard applicable under Title 5. See infra Section I C. Such Case: 18-1831 Document: 97 Page: 6 Filed: 01/31/2020 binding guidance, and the consequences of failing to follow it, are powerful tools for control of an inferior officer. 2
The Director also has unreviewable authority to institute inter partes review. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), (d). Cf. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 504 (2010) (discussing the importance of the ability to "start, stop, or alter individual [PCAOB] investigations," even where the reviewing principal officer already had significant "power over [PCAOB] activities"). Though the Arthrex panel did not address the Director's ability to reconsider an institution decision, our precedent also holds that the Board 3 may reconsider and reverse its initial institution decision. See, e.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Robert Bosch Healthcare Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1382 , 1385 −86 (Fed. Cir. 2016 ) (explaining that " § 318(a) contemplates that a proceeding can be 'dismissed' after it is instituted, and, as our prior cases have held, administrative agencies possess inherent authority to reconsider their decisions, subject to certain limitations, regardless of whether they possess explicit statutory authority to do so" (internal quotation and citation omitted)).
The Director also controls which APJs will hear any given instituted inter partes review. 35 U.S.C. § 6(c). In 2 To be sure, I do not mean to suggest that the Director's extensive powers of supervision mean that he can dictate the outcome of a specific inter partes proceeding. Rather, his ability to issue guidance and designate precedential opinions provides the general type of supervision and control over APJs' decision-making that renders them inferior, not principal, officers.
3
The Director's delegation of his institution power to the Board does not diminish its existence. 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (stating that " [t] he Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director"). See also Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. Covidien LP, 812 F.3d 1023 , 1033 (Fed. Cir. 2016 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) . Alappat contained strong language about the ability to control the composition and size of panels. See, e.g., id. at 1535 (noting that "the Board is merely the highest level of the Examining Corps, and like all other members of the Examining Corps, the Board operates subject to the Commissioner's overall ultimate authority and responsibility"). While the duties of the Board and the Director have changed since Alappat was decided, the authority to determine the Board's composition for reconsideration of an examiner's patentability determination mirrors the current authority with respect to inter partes review. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 6(c) (2012) (giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"), with 35 U.S.C. § 7(b) (1988) (giving the Commissioner power to designate "at least three members of the Board of Appeals and Interferences" to review "adverse decisions of examiners upon applications for patents"). Therefore, I believe the panel should have at least discussed how Alappat's view of the power to control the Board might impact the Appointments Clause analysis.
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Combined, all of these powers illustrate that the Director has constitutionally significant means of direction and supervision over APJs─making them inferior officers under the rule of Edmond.
B
Despite the Director's significant powers of direction and supervision, the Arthrex panel concluded that APJs are principal officers in large part because no principal officer may "single-handedly review, nullify or reverse" the Board's decisions. Arthrex, 941 F.3d at 1329. But Supreme Court precedent does not require such power. And in the cases in which the Court emphasized a principal officer's power of review, that principal officer had less authority to direct and supervise an inferior officer's work ex ante than the Director has here.
In Edmond, for instance, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, an Article I court, could review decisions of the Court of Criminal Appeals judges at issue. However, its scope of review was limited. Edmond, 520 U.S. at 665 (explaining that the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces may only reevaluate the facts when there is no "competent evidence in the record to establish each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt"). And while the Judge Advocate General "exercise[d] administrative oversight" and could "prescribe uniform rules of procedure," he could "not attempt to influence (by threat of removal or otherwise) the outcome of individual proceedings." Id. at 664. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court found that the Court of Criminal Appeals judges were inferior, not principal, officers. In comparison, while the Director may not unilaterally decide to rehear or reverse a Board decision, he has many powers to direct and supervise APJs both ex ante and ex post, Section I A, supra, that no principal officer had in Edmond. Similarly, in Freytag v. Comm'r, 501 U.S. 868 (1991) , the Supreme Court considered the status of special trial Case: 18-1831 Document: 97 Page: 11 Filed: 01/31/2020 judges appointed by the Tax Court, whose independent decision-making varied based on the type of case before them. The Court held that the special trial judges were inferior officers-not employees-when presiding over "declaratory judgment proceedings and limited-amount tax cases" because they "render[ed] the decisions of the Tax Court" in those cases. Id. at 882. In doing so, the Court distinguished between cases in which the special trial judges acted as "inferior officers who exercise independent authority," and cases in which they still had significant discretion but less independent authority. Id. In fact, the Court declined "to elaborate on Buckley's 'significant authority' test" marking the line between officer and employee, citing two parties' briefs which argued that the test between officer and employee, not principal and inferior officer, should include some measure of the finality of decision making. Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2051─52. 17 U.S.C. § 802(f)(1)(A)(i). The Librarian therefore exerts far less control over CRJs than the Director can over APJs using all the powers of direction and supervision discussed in Section I A, supra.
The ill-suited comparison to Intercollegiate in Arthrex again highlights how the unique powers of direction and supervision in each case should be viewed in totality, rather than as discrete categories weighing in favor of inferior officer status or not. In particular, by breaking up the analysis into three discrete categories-Review, Supervision, and Removal-the Arthrex panel overlooks how the powers in each category impact each other. Again, for example, whereas ex post the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces has more power to review the Court of Criminal Appeals judges' decisions than the Director has to review a Board decision, neither the JAG nor the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces have the Director's ex ante control, such as the power to decide whether to hear a case at all or to issue binding guidance on how to apply the law in a case. Viewed through this integrated lens, I believe APJs comfortably fit with prior Supreme Court precedent that has never found a principal officer in a challenged position to date. (1885)))).
The efficiency of the service standard allows supervisors to discipline and terminate employees for arguably even a wider range of reasons than the standards above, including failure or refusal to follow the Director's policy or legal guidance. Together with the significant authority the Case: 18-1831 Document: 97 Page: 15 Filed: 01/31/2020
Director wields in directing and supervising APJs' work, the ability to remove an APJ on any grounds that promote the efficiency of the service supports finding that APJs are inferior officers.
II
Assuming for the sake of argument that APJs are principal officers, a remedy is required to cure the constitutional violation arising from their present appointment scheme. However, I do not believe that the remedy proposed by the Arthrex panel comports with congressional intent as evidenced by the employment protections provided to APJs and their predecessors for over thirty years. The Arthrex panel makes APJs removable at will by partially severing 35 U.S.C. § 3(c) as it applies Title 5's removal protections to APJs. Arthrex, 941 F.3d at 1337-38. I question whether Congress would have wanted to leave APJs without the removal protections of Title 5. But, given the high standard for finding non-severability, I cannot say that the Arthrex panel's remedy was improper.
A Before proceeding to the traditional severance analysis, I must note several concerns about the panel's purported "severance." In traditional severance cases, both the unconstitutional language being severed and the remaining language are usually part of one statute enacted at the same time. In what appears to be a smaller number of cases, an unconstitutional amendment was severed from the original statute. E.g., Reitz v. Mealey, 314 U.S. 33, 38−39 (1941) , overruled in part on other grounds by Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971) . But here the "severance" is far more convoluted-to the extent that I question whether "severance" is even the appropriate characterization of the Arthrex remedy.
A court may sever the application of a particular statute without striking language explicitly. See, e.g., Nat'l 
B
When faced with an unconstitutional statute, we must determine whether severing the offending portion is possible. To do so, we must determine if the remaining statute "will function in a manner consistent with the intent of Congress." Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 685 (1987) 
(emphasis removed).
The question of severability is a weighty one and the bar for finding an unconstitutional provision non-severable is high. We "must refrain from invalidating more of the statute than is necessary. Indeed, we must retain those portions of the Act that are (1) constitutionally valid, (2) Because the statute as severed by Arthrex can function independently and is constitutionally valid, the key question is whether the statute as excised "remains consistent with Congress' initial and basic . . . intent." Id. at 264. Here, I question whether the Arthrex-excised statute does so. Congress afforded federal employment protections to APJs and their predecessors for over thirty years. And it seems unlikely to me that Congress, faced with this Appointments Clause problem, would have chosen to strip APJs of their employment protections, rather than choose some other alternative. However, because the bar for nonseverability is so high, and Congress can, at the end of the day, make another legislative choice if it disagrees with the outcome here, I reluctantly conclude that § 3(c) can be severed as it applies to the removal protections for APJs.
To be sure, I do not question the ability to sever an unconstitutional provision lightly. But our touchstone must remain the intent of Congress, and in this case, Congress has maintained federal employment protections for USPTO officers and employees, including APJs and their predecessors, from 1975 to today. This long-standing statutory protection leads me to believe that Congress intended for APJs to have removal protections, such as those incorporated through Title 5 in 35 U.S.C. § 3(c), regardless of changes made to the Board's duties in the AIA. , 7, 88 Stat. 1956 , 7, 88 Stat. , 1956 , 7, 88 Stat. (1975 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § § 3, 7 (1976) ). This amendment provided federal employment protections to examiners-in-chief. See, e.g., Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 150-51 (1974) , overruled in part on other grounds by Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985) (explaining that the LloydLaFollette Act's "efficiency of the service" standard governed the dismissal of a competitive civil service employee); Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536, 543 (1956) (describing dismissal of federal employees as governed by "general personnel laws," such as the Lloyd-LaFollette Act's "efficiency of the service" standard).
Two reasons for this change appear in the legislative history. First, due to the growing number of examiners-inchief, Presidential nomination and Senate confirmation posed a "burden." H.R. REP. NO. 93-856, at 2 (1974) . In an early case discussing the Appointments Clause, the Supreme Court said that this was exactly the reason for providing for appointment of inferior officers by people other than the President. Dep't of Navy, 767 F.2d 826, 832 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (citing the Senate's discussion of the public's right to Case: 18-1831 Document: 97 Page: 19 Filed: 01/31/2020 a government that is both "efficient and effective" and "impartially administered").
Congress then maintained these federal employment protections through several amendments over more than three decades. In 1985, Congress amended 35 U.S.C. § 7, creating the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI) from the existing Board of Appeals, and again provided that the examiners-in-chief "shall be appointed to the competitive service." 7 Patent Law Amendment Acts of 1984 , Pub. L. 98-622, title II, sec. 201, § 7(a), 98 Stat. 3383, 3386 (1984 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 7 (1988)). Though the 1978 CSRA replaced the Lloyd-LaFollette Act between the 1975 and 1985 amendments to 35 U.S.C. § 7, the CSRA maintained the "efficiency of the service" standard for discipline and dismissal of federal employees in the competitive service. 5 U.S. C. § 7513 (1978) . See also Cornelius v. Nutt, 472 U.S. 648, 669 (1985) ("The statutory phrase 'such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service' pre-dates the Civil Service Reform Act's recognition of federal sector collective bargaining.") (Marshall, J., dissenting).
In 1999, Congress made four changes significant here. First, Congress modified the statutory language governing the BPAI, moving the Board's governing language from § 7 to its current location in § 6. See Patent and Trademark Office Efficiency Act, Pub. L. 106-113, ch. 1, sec. 4717, 113 Stat. 1501 , 1501A-580 (1999 (2000)). This meant that even though their title changed, APJs remained subject to discipline or dismissal subject to the efficiency of the service standard. Finally, though Congress made significant changes to Title 35 through the AIA, it did not modify § 3(c)'s application of Title 5 protections to USPTO employees and officers. 8 35 U.S.C. § 3(c) (2012). Yet again, APJs remained subject to the efficiency of the service removal standard applicable to many federal employees.
Further confirmation regarding Congressional intent comes from the fact that § 3 provides specific, and limited, removal procedures for the Director and the Commissioner for Patents, as opposed to all other officers and employees subject to § 3(c). The Director may be removed only by the President. 35 U.S.C. § 3(a)(4). The Commissioner may be removed "for misconduct or nonsatisfactory performance" under her performance agreement, "without regard to the provisions of title 5." 35 U.S.C. § 3(b)(2)(C). That Congress described specific removal procedures for these two 8 The AIA did amend 35 U.S.C. § 3(b), see LeahySmith America Invents Act, Pub. L. 112-29, sec. 21, § 3(b), 125 Stat. 284, 336 (2011) (governing the Director's ability to fix pay for APJs), and 35 U.S.C. § 3(e)(2), id. at sec. 20 § 3(e)(2), 125 Stat. at 334 (technical amendment changing "this Act" to "that Act"). Our ability to devise a judicial remedy that does not entail quintessentially legislative work often depends on how clearly we have already articulated the background constitutional rules at issue and how easily we can articulate the remedy. . . . But making distinctions in a murky constitutional context, or where line-drawing is inherently complex, may call for a 'far more serious invasion of the legislative domain' than we ought to undertake. In sum, I believe the Director currently exercises sufficient oversight and supervision of APJs to render them inferior officers under the Appointments Clause. But if APJs must be viewed as principal officers, I question curing the ensuing constitutional violation by removing their Title 5 removal protections because I believe it conflicts with Congress's intent.
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